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USE WITH CAUTION: THE ILLINOIS HEARSAY
EXCEPTION FOR CHILD VICTIMS
OF SEXUAL ABUSE
INTRODUCTION
In 1985, Nancy and Cindy' accused their father, Paul, of sexually
abusing them.2 Twenty-three years later-after they grew up without
a father-the girls came forward and admitted it was all a lie.3 Nancy
and Cindy's mother originally accused Paul of abusing the girls amidst
a heated custody dispute.4 She claimed the girls told her that Paul
abused them.5 Despite Paul's insistence that he was innocent, the
court tried and convicted him.6 After his conviction, he did not see or
speak to his daughters for twenty years.7 Once a successful lawyer, he
struggled to earn a living as a truck driver.8 The girls grew up thinking
their father abandoned their family.9 They did not even know he went
to prison.10 After the truth came out, the court exonerated Paul, but
the damage had already been done." False accusations rather than
facts deprived a man of his freedom and deprived two children of a
father.12
Studies indicate that, in cases coinciding with a divorce or custody
dispute, allegations of child sexual abuse are false in as many as 20%
of cases.' 3 The current law in Illinois fails to adequately address this
risk or deal with the problems and complexities of sexual abuse cases.
It does not properly equip courts to reach accurate and consistent ver-
dicts because it is based solely on discretion and provides no uniform
standard for trial courts. Protecting children from abuse, especially
1. Names have been changed to protect privacy.
2. Diane Jennings, Molestation Refuted, But Man Pays Price, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov.
27, 2009, at 1A.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Robert G. Marks, Note, Should We Believe the People Who Believe the Children?: The
Need for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
207, 224 (1995).
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sexual abuse, has become a paramount concern in the past twenty
years.14 In response, the Illinois legislature provided statutory excep-
tions to the rule against using out-of-court statements as evidence (the
hearsay exception statutes).1 5 These exceptions make children's out-
of-court statements admissible when those statements concern abuse
or neglect. 16 The exceptions are intended to provide heightened pro-
tection to child victims 17 and to address some of the difficulties associ-
ated with proving these "secretive" crimes.' 8 To protect the interests
of the accused, the statutes provide that no judgment finding abuse
occurred can be based solely on a child's out-of-court statements;
some independent evidence must corroborate the statements. 19 The
hearsay exception statutes typically become important in civil cases
when a parent is accused of abusing a child and the court must deter-
mine whether to suspend custody or parental rights.
Issues arise because the statutes provide no standard for implemen-
tation. The danger is that courts will resolve doubts in favor of finding
that abuse did occur. Doing so ignores the risk that a finding of abuse
will be based on false allegations. An erroneous finding of abuse can
separate a child from a parent and destroy the life of an alleged
abuser.2 0 To account for the risks on both sides, and to ensure accu-
racy of verdicts, courts should use a formulaic test to decide cases in-
volving a child's out-of-court statements admitted under the hearsay
exception statutes. Because courts evaluate each case individually,21
they retain discretion to consider the totality of the evidence and
make a final determination. A two-part test will aid the court in exer-
14. See, e.g., John E.B. Myers, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation: Consensus
and Confusion, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (2010) (noting the alarming prevalence of
sexual abuse among children); Mary Ellen Reilly, Note, Expert Testimony on Sexually Abused
Child Syndrome in a Child Protective Proceeding: More Hurtful Than Helpful, 3 CARDOZO PuB.
L. PoL'Y & ETHICS J. 419, 419 (2005); Michelle M. Zehnder, Comment, A Step Forward: Rule
803(25), A New Approach to Child Hearsay Statements, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 875, 876-77
(1994).
15. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c) (2008); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e) (2008).
16. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e).
17. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606.
18. Reilly, supra note 14, at 426; see also Mary Ann Mason, The Child Sex Abuse Syndrome:
The Other Major Issue in State of New Jersey v. Margaret Kelly Michaels, 1 PSYCHOL. PuB.
POL'Y & L. 399, 399 (1995) ("Prosecutors often must prove a case with no corroborative evi-
dence, no witnesses, and a victim who is reluctant or unable to testify.").
19. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e).
20. See Jennings, supra note 2, at 1A.
21. See In re A.P., 688 N.E.2d 642, 650, 652 (Ill. 1997) ("Of course, whether there is sufficient
corroboration ... is a determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis.... The [trial]
court was in the best position to determine the credibility and weight of the witnesses' testimony
...1)
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cising that discretion. It will provide a guide for conducting the analy-
sis and will ensure a thorough adjudication of the evidence.
Part II of this Comment discusses the Illinois statutes that provide
the exception to the general hearsay rule. 22 Part III analyzes the
problems with how courts apply the hearsay exception statutes. Part
III also proposes a new, two-part test based on reliability factors and
forms of corroborating evidence; the test gives the court discretion to
weigh the two parts.23 Part IV shows how the proposed test will solve
problems in future cases. 24
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Illinois Hearsay Exception Statutes for Minor
Victims of Abuse or Neglect
The Illinois legislature has enacted three statutory provisions to
provide an exception to the hearsay rule for minor victims of abuse or
neglect.25 Generally, hearsay evidence is not admissible in criminal or
civil proceedings. 26 Under certain exceptions, however, a witness may
testify about a statement made out of court.27 The Illinois hearsay
exception statutes discussed herein provide such an exception in civil
proceedings that involve allegations of abuse or neglect to a child
under thirteen years old.28
22. See infra notes 25-155 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 156-282 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 283-89 and accompanying text.
25. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c) (2008); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2601 (2008); 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e) (2008).
26. See FED. R. EVID. 801; Robert R. Rugani, Jr., Comment, The Gradual Decline of a Hear-
say Exception: The Misapplication of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), the Medical Diagnosis
Hearsay Exception, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 867, 872-73 (1999).
27. See Rugani, supra note 26, at 875.
28. Section 8-2601 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides, in part,
(a) An out-of-court statement made by a child under the age of 13 describing any act
of child abuse or any conduct involving an unlawful sexual act performed in the pres-
ence of, with, by, or on the declarant child, or testimony by such of an out-of-court
statement made by such child that he or she complained of such acts to another, is
admissible in any civil proceeding, if: (1) the court conducts a hearing outside the pres-
ence of the jury and finds that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement
provide sufficient safeguards of reliability; and (2) the child either: (i) testifies at the
proceeding; or (ii) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the
act which is the subject of the statement.
(b) If a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section, the court shall instruct the jury
that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to be given to the state-
ment and that, in making its determination, it shall consider the age and maturity of the
child, the nature of the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was
made, and any other relevant factors.
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The statutes are codified in the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (the
Code),29 the Illinois Juvenile Court Act (the Juvenile Act),30 and the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the IMDMA). 31
All three hearsay exception statutes provide that out-of-court state-
ments made by minors in abuse or neglect cases are admissible evi-
dence.32 Each one constitutes a statutorily created exception to the
rule precluding hearsay evidence. The Juvenile Act and the IMDMA
provide substantively identical provisions.33 Under those two provi-
sions, out-of-court statements by a child under thirteen "relating to"
allegations of abuse or neglect are automatically admissible as evi-
dence. 34 Although the Code provides a similar hearsay exception, it
differs because it requires the court to bifurcate its analysis by con-
ducting a reliability hearing before admitting statements into evi-
dence; the court has discretion, and the statements are not
automatically admissible. 35
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2601. Under this statute, the judge must first conduct a hearing to
determine whether the out-of-court statements are reliable. Id. If they satisfy the reliability test,
the judge may admit the statements and the jury will weigh their credibility. Id. The judge may
properly admit statements if the child testifies or is "unavailable" to testify. Id. A court may
consider a child unavailable when he is too young to testify in court. Reilly, supra note 14, at
429.
Section 606(e) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act provides,
Previous statements made by the child relating to any allegations that the child is an
abused or neglected child within the meaning of the Abused and Neglected Child Re-
porting Act, or an abused or neglected minor within the meaning of the Juvenile Court
Act of 1987, shall be admissible in evidence in a hearing concerning custody of or visita-
tion with the child. No such statement, however, if uncorroborated and not subject to
cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e) (footnotes omitted). Under this provision, the court admits any
out-of-court statements and determines reliability as part of its final adjudication. Id. A sepa-
rate hearing is not necessary. Id. Typically, this statute will apply in bench trials, rather than
cases involving juries. Id.
Section 2-18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act provides, "Previous statements made by the mi-
nor relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence. However, no
such statement, if uncorroborated and not subject to cross-examination, shall be sufficient in
itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect." 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c). This sec-
tion is substantively identical to the IMDMA provision described above. Both statutes provide
that the statements "shall be admissible," meaning that the trial judge does not have discretion
to exclude relevant out-of-court statements. The IMDMA typically applies in cases regarding
custody of children in conjunction with divorce, while the Juvenile Act applies in custody or
visitation situations outside of divorce.
29. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2601(a).
30. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c).
31. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e).
32. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2601(a); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/606(e).
33. Compare 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c), with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e).
34. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e).
35. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2601(a).
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The most significant provision, which all three hearsay exception
statutes share, is the corroboration requirement.3 6 Under the Code, a
judge cannot admit statements that are not supported by corroborat-
ing evidence. 37 Under the Juvenile Act and the IMDMA, the judge
must admit the statements but cannot rest an ultimate finding that
abuse occurred on out-of-court statements alone.38 Those two stat-
utes require corroborating evidence for the hearsay statements before
the court can make a final adjudication that abuse occurred. 39 The
Code provision applies more to jury trials while the Juvenile Act and
the IMDMA are appropriate for bench trials.40 This Comment fo-
cuses on civil bench trials that decide custody and visitation rights;
therefore, the terms of the Juvenile Act and the IMDMA are most
relevant for this discussion.
B. Justifications for the Hearsay Exception Statutes
Two chief justifications drive the hearsay exception statutes: neces-
sity and protection. 41 The necessity justification is based on two
grounds: children cannot testify effectively,42 and a child's statements
are often the most important evidence.43 The first aspect of the neces-
sity justification is the general belief that children should not testify
against an abuser in open court.44 Studies show that both testifying in
court and confronting an abuser are traumatic experiences for a child
36. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c) ("[Nbo such statement, if uncorroborated and not
subject to cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neg-
lect."); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2601(a) ("An out-of-court statement ... is admissible in any
civil proceeding, if . . . the child either: (i) testifies at the proceeding; or (ii) is unavailable as a
witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement.");
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e) ("No such statement ... if uncorroborated and not subject to
cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect.").
37. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2601(a).
38. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e).
39. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e).
40. The hearsay exception statutes do not explicitly dictate the situations in which each is
applicable. Which statute applies to which types of cases is a subject of some uncertainty. For a
full explanation of the three statutes and when each applies, see generally Thomas A. Else,
Hearsay Statements of Abused Children in Order of Protection Cases: An Analysis of Alternate
Statutory Interpretations, 19 DuPAGE COUNTY B. Ass'N BRIEF 14 (2006) (describing the material
differences between the three hearsay exception statutes and analyzing when courts apply each
one).
41. See Judy Yun, Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex
Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1745, 1751 (1983).
42. See id. ("Requiring a child victim to testify in a sex abuse case adversely affects his or her
perception and memory and yields poor and unconvincing evidence. The courtroom experience
is extremely traumatic and stressful for most children . . . ." (footnotes omitted)).
43. See Myers, supra note 14, at 3-4 (discussing the difficulty of proving sexual crimes against
children due to lack of witnesses and physical evidence); Zehnder, supra note 14, at 883.
44. See Yun, supra note 41, at 1751.
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who has suffered abuse.45 Courts seek to protect a child from such
trauma, particularly when he is in the process of recovering from the
psychological effects of abuse.46 Not only does testifying have an ad-
verse effect on the child, the testimony might be inaccurate or
skewed.47 Children are extremely susceptible to manipulation or con-
fusion, and they are ill-equipped to handle the pressures of cross-ex-
amination.48 More likely than not, a child will change his story in
court,4 9 agree with a cross-examiner,50 or provide incomplete or inco-
herent answers simply because the pressure is great.51 For these rea-
sons, children are often unfit to handle the stress of testifying and are
undesirable as witnesses. 52
The second aspect of the necessity justification recognizes the real-
ity that sexual abuse is difficult, if not impossible, to prove without
evidence of the child's out-of-court statements.53 Courts and com-
mentators call sexual abuse of children a "secret crime."54 Often, the
abuser is a parent, stepparent, teacher, or other adult close to the
child.55 A close relationship provides opportunity to perpetrate abuse
and makes it easy to conceal that abuse from others.56 Eyewitness
accounts are rare.57 Due to the secret nature of sexual crimes against
children, the child's accusations are usually the most probative and the
most relevant evidence.58 As discussed above, it may be impossible
45. See Marks, supra note 13, at 225 ("A number of researchers have suggested that some
children are traumatized by the courtroom experience." (footnote omitted)).
46. See id.
47. See Yun, supra note 41, at 1752 ("(C)hildren, if they reply at all, often give confused and
inaccurate answers." (footnote omitted)).
48. See id. ("Children are susceptible to leading questions and often tailor their replies to
appease the examining attorney." (footnotes omitted)); see also Jean Montoya, Something Not
So Funny Happened on the Way to Conviction: The Pretrial Interrogation of Child Witnesses, 35
ARIz. L. REV. 927, 933 (1993) (indicating that high suggestibility in children creates a strong risk
of fabricated allegations).
49. See Krista MacNevin Jee, Comment, Hearsay Exceptions in Child Abuse Cases: Have the
Courts and Legislatures Really Considered the Child?, 19 WHrflIER L. REV. 559, 582 (1998).
50. See Yun, supra note 41, at 1752.
51. Id.; see also Montoya, supra note 48, at 934.
52. See Yun, supra note 41, at 1752.
53. See Myers, supra note 14, at 3-4; Zehnder, supra note 14, at 883 ("Child sexual abuse is a
'secret' crime and one typically not involving discernible signs of physical violence. Therefore,
the child's statements may be the only evidence of the crime." (footnote omitted)).
54. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 14, at 3-4; Yun, supra note 41, at 1745 ("The crimes committed
. almost always occur in secrecy, with the child usually being the only witness." (footnote
omitted)).
55. Yun, supra note 41, at 1745 ("[M]ore often than not, the offender is a parent, relative, or
an acquaintance of the child." (footnote omitted)).
56. See id. at 1745-46.
57. See id. at 1745; see also Myers, supra note 14, at 3-4.
58. See Yun, supra note 41, at 1745-46.
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for the child victim to testify live. 59 Therefore, without the hearsay
exceptions, the child's statements would be completely excluded from
evidence.60 The hearsay exception statutes preclude this undesirable
result and allow litigation to proceed with all the facts in evidence.61
The second main justification for the hearsay statutes is child pro-
tection.62 The protection justification invokes a balancing test that ul-
timately values a child's safety over the need to exclude questionable
evidence.63 Although a child's out-of-court statements carry all the
problems with reliability that the prohibition on hearsay generally
seeks to prevent,64 the goal of protecting children from abuse is so
important that the legislature chose to overlook the reliability issues.65
This reflects a policy decision that protecting children from abuse is
important enough to allow courts to rely upon evidence that is typi-
cally considered unreliable. 66
C. How Courts Apply the Hearsay Exception Statutes
One Illinois Supreme Court case 67 and several Illinois appellate
caseS68 have employed and interpreted the hearsay exception statutes.
Through these cases, courts have established some generally accepted
rules of application.69 However, the cases have also created questions
that have yet to be answered and some inconsistencies have arisen.
Courts typically examine two aspects of cases involving out-of-court
59. See id. at 1751-53.
60. See Jee, supra note 49, at 563 ("[Slome noteworthy, but untrustworthy, evidence may be
inevitably lost.").
61. See Myers, supra note 14, at 3-4; see also Reilly, supra note 14, at 430 ("Historically, if, for
whatever reason, the State does not put the child on the stand and there is no additional evi-
dence of abuse, then the petition must be dismissed." (footnote omitted)).
62. See In re A.P., 688 N.E.2d 642, 649 (Ill. 1997) ("In section 1-2 of the Act, the legislature
directed that the purpose and policy of the Act is to serve and protect the best interests of
minors.").
63. See id. ("In section 2-18(4)(c), the legislature sought to balance the welfare interests of
minors and the rights of those accused of abuse or neglect.").
64. See Montoya, supra note 48, at 933; Marks, supra note 13, at 225 ("[Clhild hearsay, espe-
cially hearsay not subject to cross-examination, may not be reliable.").
65. See A.P., 688 N.E.2d at 649.
66. Illinois courts have not yet considered the impact of the Confrontation Clause on the
hearsay exception statutes. In A.P., the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly declined to face the
question. Id. at 652. A discussion of the Confrontation Clause is outside the scope of this
Comment.
67. See id.
68. See In re Gilbert, 822 N.E.2d 116, 121-23 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); In re K.O., 782 N.E.2d 835,
843 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); Daria W. v. Bradley W., 738 N.E.2d 974, 977-78 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); In
re Alba, 540 N.E.2d 1116, 1118 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); In re K.L.M., 496 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986); In re Brunken, 487 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
69. See, e.g., A.P., 688 N.E.2d at 649-50 (holding that, as long as the occurrence of abuse is
corroborated, the identity of the abuser can be established by out-of-court statements alone).
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statements: the reliability of the statements and the evidence that cor-
roborates them. 7 0 This Section discusses the factors that typically de-
fine that analysis.
1. Reliability: Factors That Affect the Weight of Out-of-Court
Statements
Reliability is always a concern when one witness testifies to prove
the assertions of another. Illinois courts have not established a mini-
mum standard for reliability of out-of-court statements admitted
under the hearsay exception statutes.7' Even without a uniform stan-
dard, courts always consider the reliability of out-of-court state-
ments.72 Statements that are more reliable carry more evidentiary
value.73 The following factors typically add to or detract from
reliability.
The first factor courts often consider when determining whether a
child's out-of-court statement is reliable is the circumstances under
which the child made the statement.74 In In re A.P., the court relied
heavily upon the fact that the child's statements were spontaneous to
hold that they were reliable enough to support a finding of abuse.75
Courts consider spontaneous statements to be much more reliable
than those that are responses to questions. 76 Prompting degrades the
statements' evidentiary value because children are extremely suscepti-
ble to suggestion and will perpetuate a fantasy if they think doing so
will please an adult.77
70. See id. at 652 (relying on the consistency of the child's statements as well as her doctor's
testimony).
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., id. at 651 ("The totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of A.P.'s
statements indicates that the statements were sufficiently reliable to be used to support a finding
of abuse."); Gilbert, 822 N.E.2d at 122 ("[T]he trial judge is presumed to have considered the
time, content and circumstances under which the statement was made in determining the relia-
bility of the statements."); K.L.M., 496 N.E.2d at 1266 ("[T]his hearsay evidence bore a high
likelihood of being reliable.").
73. Many states have hearsay exception statutes similar to those in Illinois; courts in those
states also emphasize reliability. See Linda D. Elrod & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the
Fifty States, 27 FAM. L.Q. 515, 680-82 (1994).
74. A.P., 688 N.E.2d at 651 (discussing "[tihe totality of the circumstances surrounding the
making of A.P.'s statements"); accord In re K.O., 782 N.E.2d 835, 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
75. A.P., 688 N.E.2d at 651 ("The totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of
A.P.'s statements indicates that the statements were sufficiently reliable to be used to support a
finding of abuse.").
76. Some states with similar statutes preclude admission of statements made in response to
any questioning or prompting. See Marks, supra note 13, at 222-25.
77. Id. at 222; see also Montoya, supra note 48, at 933 (indicating that children are highly
suggestible).
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Courts also consider the timing of the statements an important fac-
tor: statements the child made before an investigation commenced are
typically considered more reliable.78 To combat bias concerns, some
states allow admission of out-of-court statements made before an in-
vestigation commenced but refuse to admit statements made after al-
legations arose.79 Illinois does not follow that rule, and the Illinois
hearsay exception statutes encompass any out-of-court statement by a
child relating to abuse or neglect.80 Often, the child makes relevant
statements in the course of an interview designed to investigate an
allegation,81 in a psychological evaluation ordered by a court after al-
legations arose,82 or to a law enforcement officer. These statements
are admissible under the hearsay exception statutes.83
Another factor courts consider is the frequency with which the
statements were made. Courts typically reason that repetition makes
statements more reliable.84 Experts agree because children are un-
likely to persist in telling a fabricated story.85 Repeated statements
are only valuable, however, if they are repeated without leading or
encouragement.86 Studies show that a child's inaccurate description
of an incident might develop over time in response to encouragement
by an adult questioning him.87 Overall, when a child persists in re-
peating statements, courts generally consider the statements more
reliable.88
Consistency is another important factor courts consider when deter-
mining the reliability of a child's statements. Statements can be con-
sistent as to the details contained therein. 89 They can also be
consistent with respect to a child's continued insistence that he has
been abused. Courts rely heavily on the consistency of the child's
statements when determining whether a finding of abuse is war-
78. Marks, supra note 13, at 243-44.
79. Id.
80. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c) (2008); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2601(a) (2008);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e) (2008).
81. See, e.g., In re K.O., 782 N.E.2d 835, 839-40 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (relying partly on evidence
that the child described abuse to the investigating detective).
82. See, e.g., Daria W. v. Bradley W., 738 N.E.2d 974, 977 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (relying on a
court-appointed psychologist who questioned the child and later testified as to statements the
child made in a counseling session).
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., In re A.P., 688 N.E.2d 642, 651 (Ill. 1997) (noting that the statements were "spon-
taneous, repeated and consistent").
85. Yun, supra note 41, at 1751.
86. See Marks, supra note 13, at 244.
87. See id.; see also Montoya, supra note 48, at 933.
88. See, e.g., A.P., 688 N.E.2d at 651.
89. See, e.g., Daria W. v. Bradley W., 738 N.E.2d 974, 979 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
2011]1 1237
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ranted.90 The accounts of abuse do not have to be exactly the same
each time, but courts value general consistency.91 For example, in
Daria W. v. Bradley W., the court cited consistency as support for the
child's statements despite the fact that "details of the occurrence
varied." 92
The age of the child is another factor that courts commonly consider
to determine reliability.9' Some experts opine that children below a
certain age are incapable of fabricating accounts of sexual abuse. 94 In
contrast, other experts assert that children of a young age are predis-
posed to fantasize and tell stories and, therefore, their accounts are
not inherently reliable.95 Typically, courts doubt that a young child
will fabricate abuse allegations because they simply do not know
enough about sexual matters to do so. 96
Accuracy of the statements is a factor courts often mention when
analyzing whether the child's statements are reliable. 97 A court's ac-
curacy analysis often depends on a child's ability to describe the sex-
ual anatomy of the alleged abuser, semen, or other sexual matters
typically unknown to a child.98 Some courts have relied heavily on
this evidence to support a finding of abuse.99 Courts typically state
90. See A.P., 688 N.E.2d at 651 ("A.P.'s accounts of the abuse were consistent as to both the
act and as to the identity of the abuser."); In re K.O., 782 N.E.2d 835, 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
("C.W.'s statements to Dorfman and Nelis that she was sexually abused by respondent were
consistent as to both the act and the identity of the [abuser] .... ).
91. See, e.g., Daria W., 738 N.E.2d at 979 ("Although details of the occurrence varied, her
rendition of the specific act of abuse was consistent."); see also Nancy E. Walker, Forensic Inter-
views of Children: The Components of Scientific Validity and Legal Admissibility, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 149, 158-59 (2002) (asserting that inconsistency is common for recollections
by children but does not necessarily indicate fabrication).
92. Daria W., 738 N.E.2d at 979; see also Walker, supra note 91, at 158.
93. See Walker, supra note 91, at 156-58 (noting that, because children's brains are not fully
developed, they have trouble distinguishing reality from fiction); Yun, supra note 41, at 1751
(indicating that some scholars argue that statements by young children are inherently unreliable
due to a tendency to fantasize in early years).
94. See Yun, supra note 41, at 1751.
95. See id.
96. See, e.g., In re K.L.M., 496 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) ("She would have to
have been a child of great, natural theatrical talent to have concocted such a tale and presented
it as she did.").
97. See In re Gilbert, 822 N.E.2d 116, 124 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (noting the child's ability to
describe an erect penis); In re K.O., 782 N.E.2d 835, 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (relying in part on
hearsay evidence that the child accurately described semen); In re C.C., 586 N.E.2d 498, 504 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991) (stating that the child's ability to describe semen weighed in favor of finding that
abuse occurred).
98. See K.O., 782 N.E.2d at 844 ("An eight year old child would not have been able to de-
scribe semen unless she had seen it, which is unlikely unless the events C.W. described had
actually taken place.").
99. See C.C., 586 N.E.2d at 503 ("Another highly probative fact was C.C.'s ability to describe
semen." (emphasis added)).
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that children would be unable to describe sexual details unless they
had suffered some form of abuse or inappropriate exposure.oo Illi-
nois appellate courts took this view in both In re K.O.101 and In re
C. C,102 two cases that relied on the accuracy of the children's descrip-
tion of semen as proof that abuse occurred.
Courts also look to the number of witnesses testifying to the same
statements. For example, multiple witnesses might observe the child
discussing abuse with an examiner in an interview. 0 3 Normally, dupli-
cative evidence is inadmissible as irrelevant.'0 However, more wit-
nesses testifying to a child's statements can provide different
descriptions of those statements. 05 They can also provide different
perspectives on the child's demeanor. These multiple perspectives can
help the trier of fact get a fuller picture of what the child said and how
she said it. Furthermore, testimony by multiple witnesses reduces the
possibility that a hearsay witness is fabricating the story, which is one
concern with hearsay evidence. 0 6 This is particularly important when
the hearsay witness is a parent, as prompting is always a concern when
evaluating statements made by children.107 If the child said the same
thing to two different people on different occasions, each person who
heard the statements may testify. The two hearsay witnesses may not
serve as independent corroboration for one another, but they can bol-
ster one another's credibility and show that the out-of-court state-
ments are more reliable.
Coaching is an important consideration in determining the validity
of any child abuse allegations.108 The risk of both intentional and un-
intentional coaching is high.'09 The dangers associated with coaching
100. Id.
101. See K.O., 782 N.E.2d at 844 (holding that the child's accurate description of semen was
"highly probative").
102. See CC, 586 N.E.2d at 503 (stating that the child's accusations were almost certainly true
because he accurately described semen).
103. See In re Gilbert, 822 N.E.2d 116, 119 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (involving a detective and
DCFS worker who observed the victim interview through one-way glass).
104. FED. R. EVID. 403.
105. See Reilly, supra note 14, at 427 (arguing that children alter their stories based on the
bias of the person to whom they are speaking).
106. See Marks, supra note 13, at 221 ("Hearsay testimony may be erroneous because it is
based upon . . . an intentional falsification by either the declarant or the person to whom the
statement was made." (footnote omitted)).
107. See Reilly, supra note 14, at 427.
108. See id.
109. See Marks, supra note 13, at 221-22; see also Walker, supra note 91, at 158 ("'For chil-
dren, .... information obtained from parents and other sources is "real". (quoting DEBRA
A. POOLE & MICHAEL LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF CHILDREN: A GUIDE FOR HELP-
ING PROFESSIONALS 45 (1998)).
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are very real;"i0 studies show that children are willing and able to
fabricate or adjust their recollections to please an adult."' A suspi-
cious or worried adult can accidentally prompt the child into
fabrication.112 Beyond that, parents might have motivation to manip-
ulate their child's words or might develop automatic suspicions con-
cerning the other parent."13 One study indicates that the incidence of
false reporting of sexual abuse is as high as 20% when made during
divorce litigation, while false reporting occurs between 5-7% of the
time under other circumstances.' 14 Due to the high risk of coaching,
courts usually keep in mind parents' potential motives to coach their
children and consider evidence that coaching or fabrication may have
taken place.115
As it would with any evidence, the court must evaluate the reliabil-
ity of the out-of-court statements admitted under the hearsay excep-
tion statutes. The court decides how much evidentiary weight those
statements receive as a result of their reliability. The reliability analy-
sis, however, is only half of the story. Because the hearsay exception
statutes specifically require that a finding of abuse cannot rest on out-
of-court statements alone, the court must determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to corroborate the statements.
2. Corroboration: The "Independent Evidence" Requirement
In determining a verdict in a sexual abuse case, the court considers
the child's statements along with any outside evidence corroborating
those statements. The hearsay exception statutes mandate that the
court may not rest a finding of abuse on out-of-court statements
alone.11 6 The amount and validity of the corroborating evidence is
essential to the verdict. The Illinois Supreme Court defined corrobo-
ration in A.P. using a plain language approach." 7 The essential aspect
of the definition is that the corroborating evidence must be
independent.118
110. See Marks, supra note 13, at 222.
111. See id. at 223-24; see also Walker, supra note 91, at 158.
112. See Marks, supra note 13, at 222.
113. See Jee, supra note 49, at 561.
114. See Marks, supra note 13, at 224.
115. See, e.g., In re Gilbert, 822 N.E.2d 116, 124 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (noting that none of the
parties had motivation to fabricate the allegations).
116. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c) (2008) ("However, no such statement, if uncor-
roborated . .. shall be sufficient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect."); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/606(e) (2008) ("No such statement, however, if uncorroborated ... shall be suffi-
cient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect.").
117. In re A.P., 688 N.E.2d 642, 650 (Ill. 1997).
118. Id.
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Courts have sought to determine the parameters of the corrobora-
tion requirement, which states that "no such statement, if uncorrobo-
rated and not subject to cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself
to support a finding of abuse or neglect."119 The term "corroborate"
is not defined by any of the three hearsay exception statutes.120 In
A.P., the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that, because the term is
not defined in the statutes, it is appropriate to "rely on its plain and
ordinary meaning."121 As a starting point, the court cited the diction-
ary definition for "corroboration," which states, "'To corroborate'
means to add weight or credibility to a thing by additional and con-
firming facts or evidence, and 'corroborating evidence' means evi-
dence supplementary to that already given and tending to strengthen
or confirm it."122
The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that corroborating evidence
must be independent evidence that makes it more probable than not
that abuse occurred.123 The court's holding accords with the clear
mandate in the hearsay exception statutes that an out-of-court state-
ment cannot, "in itself," support a finding of abuse.124 In other words,
some evidence outside the statement, standing on its own, must tend
to confirm the facts alleged.125 This independent evidence framework
is an important aspect of the corroboration requirement.126
Corroborating evidence can be physical or circumstantial.127 Trial
judges have discretion to admit any relevant evidence that is not un-
fairly prejudicial.128 Any admitted evidence can serve to corroborate
the statements of a minor.129 The Illinois Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that "[t]he form of corroboration will vary depending on the
facts of each case."o30 This interpretation recognizes the factual varia-
119. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c); see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2601(a) (2008);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e).
120. See A.P., 688 N.E.2d at 650.
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting BLACK's LAw DicriONARY 344-45 (6th ed. 1990)).
123. Id.
124. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c) ("However, no such statement, if uncorrobo-
rated . .. shall be sufficient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect." (emphasis added));
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e) ("No such statement, however, if uncorroborated ... shall be
sufficient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect." (emphasis added)).
125. See A.P., 688 N.E.2d at 650.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 652.
129. See id. at 650.
130. Id.
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tion from case-to-case and preserves the trial court's discretion. 131
The supreme court definitively established that, while the occurrence
of abuse must be corroborated, the identity of the abuser need not be
corroborated by independent evidence. 132 The following types of evi-
dence arise most often in civil sexual abuse cases to corroborate child
hearsay statements.
Medical testing is often used in child sexual abuse cases.133 Pedia-
tricians examine a child to look for evidence of trauma, scarring or
bruising, physical abnormalities, or injuries consistent with sexual
abuse.134 If a physician performs an examination, DNA matches can
prove abuse.135 Physical evidence is not always available because sex-
ual crimes against children are often not invasive and cause no physi-
cal damage.136 For this reason, courts must often rely on
circumstantial evidence to corroborate out-of-court allegations.
Courts often entertain evidence of behavioral changes in a child as
corroboration for abuse allegations.' 37 Typically, the child's parent or
caretaker will testify about changes in the child's behavior and an ex-
pert will offer an opinion as to the meaning of those changes. 38
Courts and commentators recognize the limitations of behavioral evi-
dence.139 Sometimes, the same behavior can either prove or disprove
abuse.140 For instance, in In re Brunken, an expert testified that a
child who had suffered abuse by a parent would want to spend time
with that parent.141 However, children who are not abused also want
to spend time with their parents. Other types of behavioral changes
are not always so ambiguous. When children have trouble in school,
develop fears or phobias, become anxious or depressed, begin wetting
131. See Daria W. v. Bradley W., 738 N.E.2d 974, 978 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (noting that the trial
court "has broad discretion to decide whether abuse ... occurred").
132. A.P., 688 N.E.2d at 649.
133. See, e.g., id. at 647 (relying in part on testimony from a pediatrician that the victim sus-
tained vaginal injuries that were most likely caused by abuse).
134. See, e.g., id. at 646-47.
135. See Myers, supra note 14, at 7-9; see also Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Proba-
ble Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN's L.J. 3, 11-16
(2010) (discussing the process of matching perpetrators to DNA samples and calling DNA evi-
dence the "gold standard" of proof).
136. See Reilly, supra note 14, at 426.
137. See id. at 435-37.
138. See, e.g., In re K.O., 782 N.E.2d 835, 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (citing testimony by the
child's caretaker that the child began wetting the bed, developed behavioral issues at school and
home, and became fearful of men following the alleged abuse).
139. See Mason, supra note 18, at 402; see also Myers, supra note 14, at 25-31; Reilly, supra
note 14, at 419.
140. In re Brunken, 487 N.E.2d 397, 400 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
141. See id.
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the bed, regress in their development, or come to fear normal activi-
ties, a problem clearly exists.142 The issue then becomes whether the
problem causing the changes is sexual abuse or another trauma in the
child's life. 143
Courts often look to the actions of the accused as well as those of
the child. 144 Prior convictions for sexual crimes or registration as a sex
offender can be valuable corroboration. 145 Evidence that the accused
violated a court order can also serve as corroboration. Of course, this
is circumstantial evidence, but it is valid because it may tend to show
that abuse is more or less likely to have occurred. 146 Further evidence
that the accused has acted inappropriately absent the mandate of a
court order can also serve as corroborative, albeit circumstantial, evi-
dence. Courts have relied upon the reactions of an accused in re-
sponse to allegations to either support or refute those allegations.147
Parties may also present witnesses who testify as to the nature of in-
teractions between the accused and the child. 148 For example, in
Brunken, the accused's parents testified that they had never observed
any inappropriate behavior by their son towards his child. 149
The final important form of evidence courts rely on to corroborate
out-of-court statements is expert testimony. Experts usually render
opinions based on two factors: their interactions and observations of
the child and their general experience in the field.1so Opinions can be
general or specific to the child; the same expert may provide both.151
142. Myers, surpa note 14, at 25-26.
143. See Reilly, supra note 14, at 444. "[Tlhe same attributes observed in known victims of
child sexual abuse may also be characteristic of a child who has suffered through a different
trauma." Id. Particularly in divorce cases, the source of the trauma is often family discord as a
result of the dissolution of the marriage. Id. Compounded with the higher incidence of false
reporting in divorce cases, behavioral changes are particularly suspect in this context. See id.
144. See, e.g., In re K.O., 782 N.E.2d 835, 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) ("[H]earsay testimony of
C.W.'s sexual abuse was corroborated by respondent's indictment and conviction for predatory
criminal sexual assault ... and C.W.'s medical assessment . . . ."); see also Myers, supra note 14,
at 27.
145. K.O., 782 N.E.2d at 844.
146. See In re A.P., 688 N.E.2d 642, 650 (111. 1997) ("The form of corroboration will vary
depending on the facts of each case and can include physical or circumstantial evidence.").
147. See In re Brunken, 487 N.E.2d 397, 400 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) ("In House's opinion Barry's
reactions were appropriate . . . . House expressed doubts whether the allegations against Barry
were true.").
148. See, e.g., In re C.C., 586 N.E.2d 498, 502 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (considering testimony by
the family's long-time pastor that he had never observed unusual behavior among family mem-
bers); Brunken, 487 N.E.2d at 400 (allowing testimony of the respondent's parents that the vic-
tim never complained of abuse to them and that the victim behaved normally in their presence).
149. Brunken, 487 N.E.2d at 400.
150. Reilly, supra note 14, at 435-36.
151. Id.; see generally Myers, supra note 14, at 1.
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Because abuse often occurs between family members and involves
conflicting accusations, experts may be needed to intervene, evaluate
a situation, and report to the court.152 They are also necessary for
their capacity to decipher the words and behavior of the child.153 In
cases that are factually complex, ongoing, or particularly difficult,
courts can also appoint examiners or guardians ad litem to conduct an
investigation and offer an impartial recommendation based on the
child's best interest. 54 Experts can testify to the typical reaction of a
child suffering abuse and compare that general testimony to the be-
havior of the specific child in the case. 155
As stated, the basic rules for applying the hearsay exception statutes
have evolved largely through case law decided by the Illinois appellate
courts. The above list describes the types of evidence that courts typi-
cally examine when adjudicating cases involving the hearsay exception
statutes. Trial courts also typically consider basic indicators of reliabil-
ity to determine how much weight to grant the out-of-court state-
ments. Therefore, rulings in sexual abuse cases invoking the hearsay
exception statutes involve two significant factors: reliability of out-of-
court statements and corroborative evidence for those statements.
III. ANALYSIS
In a sexual abuse case, the court must wade through murky legal
analysis that often results in uncertainty. One Illinois appellate court
stated, "We have found no cases indicating what is sufficient corrobo-
ration under [a hearsay exception statute]." 5 6 Courts need an estab-
lished standard to ensure both consistency and accuracy of verdicts.
This Comment focuses on the particular issues that trial judges face
when they determine whether a child has been abused. The goal is to
create a more concrete analytical framework that judges can apply in
bench trials. To reach that goal, this Part proposes a new test that
addresses how to analyze different types of corroborating evidence in
accord with the hearsay exception statutes. The proposed test con-
tains a bifurcated analysis that emphasizes the need to distinguish the
reliability of a child's accusations from the corroboration for those
accusations.
152. See Reilly, supra note 14, at 426.
153. Id. at 437.
154. See id. at 438-39.
155. See id. at 435-36.
156. In re Brunken, 487 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
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A. Balancing Risks in Sexual Abuse Cases
In the context of sexual abuse, the most obvious risk is that abuse
will continue as a result of an incorrect judicial decision. However, a
countervailing risk exists in every case: the risk that a child will be
forever separated from a parent due to false allegations.157 The Illi-
nois Supreme Court has recognized the state legislature's effort to
protect children by enacting the hearsay exception statutes.'58 It also
recognized the interests of the accused by pointing out that courts
must consider those interests "without severely diminishing the wel-
fare interests of the minor."159 Every sexual abuse case is a balancing
process.
Due to the serious nature of sexual abuse allegations, a court might
be inclined to resolve doubts in favor of a finding that abuse occurred.
It would then impose a restriction on the parental rights of the ac-
cused. Such a solution seems, at first blush, safer because it leaves no
question that the accused will no longer abuse the child. However, it
exposes the child to another serious risk: losing an important person
in his life. As the court in Brunken stated, "Parent and child have an
inherent and valuable right to each other's society."160 Because there
is no uniform standard for adjudicating sexual abuse cases, courts are
left to balance the risks without any structure.
B. Problems with Current Jurisprudence Involving
the Hearsay Exception Statutes
1. Differentiating Corroboration from Reliability and the
Independent Evidence Requirement
Illinois appellate courts have interpreted the corroboration require-
ment of the hearsay statutes differently; a consistent standard for ana-
lyzing the evidence is lacking. Compounding the problem is the fact
that courts do not agree on how much corroboration is required or
about what types of evidence can serve as corroboration. The Illinois
Supreme Court case In re A.P. interpreted the hearsay exception stat-
utes but failed to resolve the discrepancy between corroboration and
reliability.161
157. See generally Jennings, supra note 2, at 1A; see also Myers, supra note 14, at 4 ("[G]reat
care must be taken to safeguard the innocent against false accusation.").
158. In re A.P., 688 N.E.2d 642, 649 (Ill. 1997).
159. Id.
160. Brunken, 487 N.E.2d at 402 (citing In re Prough, 376 N.E.2d 1078, 1082 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978)).
161. See A.P., 688 N.E.2d at 648-50.
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The lack of a corroboration standard creates problems because
courts tend to conflate the concept of reliability with that of corrobo-
ration.162 Although reliability and corroboration are both important
aspects of the final analysis in sexual abuse cases, they should remain
separate. A child's out-of-court accusations are reliable if they are
believable or trustworthy. Corroboration is independent evidence
that supports the accusations. The statutes clearly require
corroboration.
The hearsay exception statutes state that the court cannot rely on
out-of-court statements alone to support a finding that abuse oc-
curred.163 This Comment calls that framework the "independent evi-
dence requirement." No matter how reliable a child's statement is, it
cannot support a finding that abuse occurred if no independent evi-
dence corroborates it.16 The relevant hearsay exception statutes both
state that "no such statement, if uncorroborated . . . , shall be suffi-
cient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect."165 The words
"in itself" are a small but essential part of the corroboration require-
ment. They require that some evidence outside the statement confirm
the facts alleged before a court can find that abuse occurred.166
The Illinois Supreme Court echoed the independent evidence re-
quirement in A.P. Using a plain-language approach to interpreting
the hearsay exception statutes, the court sought to define the corrobo-
ration requirement.167 As a starting point, it cited the dictionary defi-
nition, which states, "'To corroborate' means to add weight or
credibility to a thing by additional and confirming facts or evidence,
and 'corroborating evidence' means evidence supplementary to that
already given and tending to strengthen or confirm it."168 By relying
on these definitions, the court solidified the independence require-
ment for corroborating evidence.'69
Courts do not always honor the independent evidence framework.
They have found corroboration based on indicators of reliability con-
tained within the child's out-of-court statements. 70 For example, in
162. See, e.g., In re K.O., 782 N.E.2d 835, 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) ("[T]he totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the making of C.W.'s statements indicates sufficient reliability to sup-
port a finding of abuse.").
163. 705 ILL. COMp. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c) (2008); 750 ILL. Comp. STAT. 5/606(e) (2008).
164. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e).
165. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c) (emphasis added); accord 750 ILL. COMr. STAT.
5/606(e).
166. A.P., 688 N.E.2d at 650.
167. Id.
168. Id. (quoting BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 344-45 (6th ed. 1990)).
169. See id.
170. See generally In re K.O., 782 N.E.2d 835 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
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In re K. 0., the child made statements accusing her father of sexual
abuse.171 One of the factors that the court cited for corroboration was
the child's accurate description of semen.172 The court stated, "[T]he
totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of [the child's]
statements indicates sufficient reliability to support a finding of
abuse."' 73 The court reached a similar result in In re CC., noting that
the accuracy of the description constituted a "highly probative
fact."174 The accuracy of a child's statements makes her statements
more reliable; it does not, however, provide corroboration for those
statements. Holding otherwise ignores the statutory mandate that no
statement "in itself" is sufficient to support a finding of abuse.' 75
A recent appellate opinion, In re Alexis H., made the same mistake.
In Alexis H., a man was accused of sexually abusing A.H., a young
girl, and R.H., her brother.176 The court quoted A.P.'s interpretation
of the hearsay exception statute, but the quote omitted one essential
word: independent. 77 The court then went on to affirm the trial
court's ruling that abuse occurred because the children "described the
physical acts of sexual abuse committed . . . in a detailed fashion that
would be unexpected of children of their age." 78
In In re Gilbert, the court relied almost exclusively on the child's
out-of-court statements. The trial court held, and the appellate court
affirmed, that a child's father sexually abused her.179 The court cited
the child's young age as proof that she would not have the motive or
means to fabricate her story.o80 Because the appellate court found no
evidence that the child fabricated her story, it upheld the trial court's
ruling that abuse occurred.181
Unlike the Gilbert court, others have recognized that internal as-
pects of a child's statement cannot corroborate that statement. For
example, in In re Brunken, the State argued that the child's statements
were corroborated because they contained "internal consistence."1 82
The court rejected that argument, holding that corroboration must
171. Id. at 839.
172. Id. at 844 ("Another highly probative fact was C.W.'s ability to describe semen.").
173. Id.
174. In re C.C., 586 N.E.2d 498, 503-04 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
175. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c) (2008); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e) (2008).
176. In re Alexis H., 929 N.E.2d 552, 558 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
177. Id. at 568 ("[Corroborating evidence] . . . is 'evidence that makes it more probable that a
minor was abused or neglected."' (quoting In re A.P., 668 N.E.2d 642, 650 (Ill. 1997))).
178. Id.
179. In re Gilbert, 822 N.E.2d 116, 124 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. In re Brunken, 487 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
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take the form of some independent evidence.' 83 These cases show that
the problem is two-fold: courts are failing to honor the independent
evidence requirement, and they are not approaching every case
uniformly.
Though reliability should not be substituted for corroboration, the
two concepts are not wholly unrelated. In C.C., for example, the ap-
pellate court's instinct to consider the accuracy of the child's descrip-
tion of semen was not erroneous.184 The court only erred by allowing
the accuracy of the statement to serve as corroboration for that same
statement. The corroborative evidence must be wholly independent
from the statement at issue.18 5 A very reliable statement should re-
quire less corroboration because it carries more weight. Statements
holding more weight have more evidentiary value than others. How-
ever, even the most reliable statement that is offered as hearsay evi-
dence under the exceptions must be corroborated by evidence outside
that statement to support a finding of abuse. 186 To hold otherwise
would be to ignore the corroboration requirement and the indepen-
dent evidence framework completely.187
2. Hearsay Evidence as Corroboration for Out-of-Court Statements
One problem that arises in cases involving the hearsay exception
statutes is whether evidence that is itself hearsay can corroborate the
child's statements. Courts have held that multiple hearsay witnesses
cannot corroborate one another. In Brunken, the child's mother, a
DCFS worker, and a counselor testified about statements the child
made claiming abuse.188 The appellate court rejected the State's argu-
ment that the testimony of four different witnesses as to similar state-
ments provided sufficient corroboration.189 The court based its
decision on the definition of corroboration; it considered corrobora-
tive evidence to be any evidence that would make the facts alleged
more probable.190 The court stated, "We do not believe that two or
more witnesses' testimony as to what the child said renders it more
183. Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
184. In re C.C., 586 N.E.2d 498, 503-04 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
185. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c) (2008); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e) (2008).
186. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e).
187. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e).
188. In re Brunken, 487 N.E.2d 397, 399 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
189. Id. at 402-03.
190. Id. at 401 ("We have found no cases indicating what is sufficient corroboration under [the
hearsay statute]. However, 'corroborate' has been defined as 'to add weight or credibility to a
thing by additional and confirming facts or evidence."' (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICrlONARY 414
(4th ed. 1951))).
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probable that the matters allegedly asserted by [the child] were
true."191
In contrast, other courts have allowed hearsay statements of multi-
ple children to corroborate one another.'92 In K.O., two girls-K.O.
and C.W.-lived with a man who was K.O.'s father and C.W.'s stepfa-
ther.193 The State accused the man of abusing C.W.194 At trial,
neither child testified, but a detective testified to statements that C.W.
made indicating that the stepfather abused her.195 A DCFS
caseworker testified to statements that K.O. made describing sexual
contact between the stepfather and C.W.196 The trial court found that
C.W. was an abused minor, and the appellate court affirmed, stating
that the allegations "were corroborated by K.O., who witnessed the
abuse."197 Similarly, an appellate court recently held that a trial
court's ruling that abuse occurred was proper because "the children's
statements of sexual abuse corroborated each other's statements." 98
Therefore, the court allowed hearsay statements to corroborate other
hearsay statements.
Courts also grapple with the issue of whether a psychologist's ex-
pert testimony about what occurred in a victim's interview can consti-
tute corroboration.' 99 Experts can testify to their opinion based on
their experience with the child in an interview.200 The problem is that
the content of the interview constitutes hearsay itself; therefore, it is
illogical to allow this type of evidence to serve as independent corrob-
oration of the other hearsay evidence. The result has been that courts
split as to their valuation of interview evidence.
For instance, in C.C., the court allowed testimony that the child vic-
tim correctly demonstrated the abuse he suffered on anatomically cor-
rect dolls to serve as corroboration of the child's statements that such
191. Id.
192. See generally In re K.O., 782 N.E.2d 835 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
193. Id. at 838.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 839.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
198. In re Alexis H., 929 N.E.2d 552, 568 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
199. See, e.g., In re C.C., 586 N.E.2d 498, 503 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); In re Alba, 540 N.E.2d 1116,
1118 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
200. See, e.g., In re A.P., 688 N.E.2d 642, 646 (Ill. 1997) (involving the testimony of a DCFS
worker who interviewed the child victim); Daria W. v. Bradley W., 738 N.E.2d 974, 977 (lll. App.
Ct. 2000) (relying in part on the testimony of a child protection investigator who interviewed the
victim); K. 0., 782 N.E.2d at 839 (considering the testimony of a police detective who interviewed
the victims).
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abuse occurred.201 In re Alba reached the opposite result.20 2 In that
case, the child created a drawing depicting a sexual scene between
herself and her father in an interview. 203 The trial court relied on the
drawing to corroborate the child's out-of-court statements, but the ap-
pellate court reversed the trial court's ruling and held that "[c]learly,
evidence which is in itself hearsay cannot provide the corroboration
required by the statute." 204 Therefore, the court concluded, cor-
roborating evidence was completely lacking and no grounds existed to
support a finding of abuse.205 A child's description of abuse, whether
accompanied by demonstration with dolls or not, is an out-of-court
statement and cannot provide corroboration for other out-of-court
statements.
Courts should recognize that statements accompanying play in a
counseling session or interview do not constitute independent evi-
dence that makes those accusations more likely to be true. Allowing
hearsay evidence to corroborate a child's out-of-court statements fails
to address the core issue with which the corroboration requirement is
concerned: namely, that the out-of-court statements alone are too un-
reliable to support a finding of abuse.206 Therefore, courts should no
longer allow hearsay evidence to corroborate a child's out-of-court
statements.
3. Expert Testimony: Some Courts Rely on It More Than Others
A second inconsistency in sexual abuse cases involves the varying
approaches courts take with regard to expert testimony. Courts take
differing views about the evidentiary value of an expert's opinion. 207
Expert testimony and opinion evidence are complicated but important
aspects of many sexual abuse cases.208 Although expert testimony is
201. CC., 586 N.E.2d at 503 ("The children's testimony in the instant case was corroborated
by the fact that . .. C.C.'s social worker, Jeanette Jungst, observed C.C. playing with anatomi-
cally correct puppets where he recreated the secret game he played with his father . . .
202. Alba, 540 N.E.2d at 1118.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1118-19.
206. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c) (2008); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2601(a) (2008);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e) (2008).
207. Compare In re K.L.M., 496 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (relying in part on an
expert's opinion that the victim's anxiety could be related to sexual abuse), with In re Brunken,
487 N.E.2d 397, 403-04 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (holding that out-of-court statements plus general
expert testimony could not support a finding that abuse occurred).
208. See Lynne Celander DeSarbo, Comment, The Danger of Value-Laden Investigation in
Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Are Defendants' Constitutional Rights Violated When Mental Health
Professionals Offer Testimony Based on Children's Hearsay Statements and Behaviors?, 2 U. PA.
J. CONsT. L. 276, 281 (1999).
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often useful, it is also somewhat dangerous. 209 Because the truth in
sexual abuse cases is difficult to decipher and child psychology is very
complicated, courts must use this type of evidence. 210 However, they
should use caution when relying on expert testimony as determina-
tive.211 Expert opinion is simply too vague and too unreliable to com-
pletely support a finding that abuse has occurred.212 Expert testimony
is inexact because no two scientists agree about how sexual abuse af-
fects a child, and no two children react the same way to abuse.213 Ad-
ditionally, "there is no psychological test that can tell whether a child
was sexually abused." 214
Some courts have recognized the imprecise nature of expert testi-
mony and have accounted for it in their consideration of cases,215
while other courts have allowed for findings of abuse based solely on
out-of-court statements corroborated by the opinion of an expert.216
This disparate treatment of expert testimony should be resolved in
favor of downplaying the significance of expert testimony because of
its inherent unreliability.217
Some courts have recognized the dangers of relying on expert opin-
ion testimony.218 In Brunken, the only corroborating evidence on the
record was an expert's testimony.219 The State argued that the vic-
tim's desire to see her father was behavior characteristic of an abused
child and that his denial that abuse had occurred was characteristic of
an abuser. 220 A DCFS worker stated that children who are abused by
parents usually desire to spend time with their abusers. 221 The appel-
late court recognized that the factual support for the child's state-
ments was "weak." 222 The court correctly concluded that there was
209. See generally Reilly, supra note 14, at 419.
210. See id. at 442-43.
211. See generally id. at 419.
212. See Myers, supra note 14, at 28; see generally DeSarbo, supra note 208, at 276.
213. See Reilly, supra note 14, at 436.
214. Myers, supra note 14, at 28.
215. See, e.g., In re Brunken, 487 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
216. See, e.g., In re C.C., 586 N.E.2d 498, 504 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) ("Based on the testimony of
the boys' case workers, teachers, [and] doctors ... it was more likely than not that the father
sexually abused his children.").
217. See Myers, supra note 14, at 37-39 (opining that many psychologists rely only on what
the child told them and that therefore these experts can become nothing more than an authority
on whether the child is telling the truth).
218. See Brunken, 487 N.E.2d at 401.
219. Id. at 400.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 402.
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not sufficient corroboration to prove that it was more likely than not
that abuse occurred. 223
C. A Proposed Two-Part Analysis for Deciding Cases Involving
Out-of-Court Statements
To allow courts to duly consider both the reliability of the hearsay
statements and the corroborative evidence, the Illinois Supreme Court
should adopt a two-part analysis. Both considerations are important
and courts should not conflate them. Separating the two parts ensures
that trial courts require independent corroborative evidence.224 A
description of the proposed test and how courts should apply it
follows.
After trial, when all the evidence is on the record, the court begins
its analysis. The first part of the analysis considers the reliability of
the out-of-court statements. The court should consider the following
factors: (1) the circumstances under which the statements were made;
(2) the frequency of the statements; (3) the consistency of the child's
account; (4) the age of the child; (5) the accuracy of the child's state-
ments; (6) how many witnesses testified to the statements; and (7) the
possibility that a parent coached the child. Courts are considering
these factors already, but a structured test can formalize the process of
considering reliability while ensuring that reliability does not serve as
a substitute for the corroboration requirement.
After it has thoroughly considered the reliability factors, the court
can address the corroboration issue. The corroborative evidence, in
conjunction with the out-of-court statements, must be sufficient to
prove that abuse occurred by a preponderance of the evidence.225 To
decide whether there is sufficient corroboration, the court should con-
sider the following factors: (1) any medical or forensic tests finding
physical evidence; (2) behavioral changes in the child; (3) evidence
that the accused violated a court order; (4) evidence that the accused
acted improperly absent a court order; and (5) an expert opinion that
the child has likely been abused. Importantly, accuracy of a child's
description of anatomy or semen is part of the reliability analysis and
223. Id. at 403.
224. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c) (2008); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e) (2008). The
hearsay exception statute contained in the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure already mandates a
two-prong analysis for admitting out-of-court statements in abuse cases. See 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/8-2601(a)-(b) (2008). Under this statute, the judge must first conduct a hearing to deter-
mine whether the out-of-court statements are reliable. Id. If the judge finds the statements
sufficiently reliable, the judge may admit them and the jury weighs their credibility. Id.
225. In re A.P., 688 N.E.2d 642, 652 (Ill. 1997).
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not the corroboration analysis; aspects of the statements themselves
cannot serve to corroborate those same statements.
After considering each step separately, the court should determine
whether abuse occurred based on a totality of the evidence. At that
point, the court balances the two prongs of the test. A strong showing
of reliability will lead to a lesser requirement for corroboration. Evi-
dence that statements are not highly reliable will lead to a heightened
standard for corroboration. Even if the statements are so unreliable
that they have no probative value whatsoever, a strong showing of
corroboration can support a finding that abuse occurred. Importantly,
there must be some showing of corroboration in all cases because the
hearsay exception statutes mandate the corroboration requirement.226
It is essential that courts do not disregard the corroboration require-
ment or substitute reliability of statements for corroboration in light
of the independent evidence framework.227
1. Prong One: Reliability of Out-of-Court Statements
Many factors can contribute to the reliability of a child's statements.
Courts must and do consider the weight they give to the out-of-court
statements in the same way they evaluate the credibility of a live wit-
ness.228 Each factor included in the test can increase or decrease the
reliability of the statements. 229 Some factors carry more weight than
others. A discussion of the factors and the way in which courts should
analyze them follows.
Possibly the most significant factor for reliability is the circum-
stances under which the out-of-court statements were made. Sponta-
neity is a major aspect of this factor.230 Statements are more reliable
when made without prompting because children are extremely suscep-
tible to suggestion from an adult.2 3 1 A child might answer a question
about abuse affirmatively merely because he believes that the adult
226. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e).
227. See A.P., 688 N.E.2d at 650.
228. See In re Gilbert, 822 N.E.2d 116, 122 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) ("[T]he trial judge is presumed
to have considered the time, content and circumstances under which the statement was made in
determining the reliability of the statements.").
229. See A.P., 688 N.E.2d at 651 (identifying several factors that made a child's statements
reliable, including that they were consistent, were not made in response to any question, were
repeated, were spontaneous, and consistently identified the same abuser and described the same
abuse).
230. See Walker, supra note 91, at 167 (stating that a child's spontaneous statements are typi-
cally more accurate).
231. See Montoya, supra note 48, at 933; Yun, supra note 41, at 1752 ("Children are suscepti-
ble to leading questions and often tailor their replies to appease the examining attorney." (foot-
notes omitted)).
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wants to hear that answer.232 Because children are extremely suscep-
tible to suggestion, a statement made without any questioning or en-
couragement is the most reliable. 233
Repetition is the second factor in the reliability prong of the pro-
posed test. The more often a child repeats a statement, the more
likely that statement is true.2 3 4 Children are not inclined to persist in
telling the same lie without encouragement. 235 If a child is adamant
about suffering specific abuse or is willing to repeat the same story, his
statements are more reliable. 236 Repetition is not always genuine,
however, because as soon as an adult suspects abuse has occurred, the
adult might instinctively encourage the child to repeat the story or
question the child further, leading the child to repeat a false state-
ment.2 3 7 To combat this, Florida endeavors to admit only out-of-court
statements that a child makes in one interview; Rhode Island allows
admission only of statements made shortly after the alleged abuse oc-
curred.238 Illinois has not adopted such a rule and allows for admis-
sion of statements made at any time.239 Even under this rule, courts
should keep in mind that if a child repeats an accusation without
prompting, the probative value will be higher than if he repeats the
accusation in response to investigatory questions.240
Consistency of the out-of-court statements is the third factor in the
proposed test. Consistent statements are more reliable. 241 A child's
statements are consistent if the details of his story are substantially
similar each time he makes a statement.242 Courts often focus on the
consistency of a child's statements to prove that they are reliable. 243
As with any witness, a child is more likely to change details of his
story if that story is untrue. Consistency is an important factor; how-
ever, courts must take care to avoid assuming that consistent accounts
232. See Montoya, supra note 48, at 933; Yun, supra note 41, at 1752.
233. See Ashish S. Joshi, Taint Hearings: Scientific and Legal Underpinnings, 34 CHAMPION 36,
36 (2010).
234. Yun, supra note 41, at 1751 ("[Ilt is highly unlikely that children persist in lying to their
parents or other figures of authority about sex abuse." (footnote omitted)).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Marks, supra note 13, at 222-23.
238. See Jee, supra note 49, at 579, 583.
239. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-18(4)(c) (2008); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/606(e) (2008).
240. See Reilly, supra note 14, at 427.
241. See Yun, supra note 41, at 1751.
242. See Daria W. v. Bradley W., 738 N.E.2d 974, 979 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) ("Although details
of the occurrence varied, her rendition of the specific act of abuse was consistent.").
243. Id.; see also In re K.O., 782 N.E.2d 835, 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) ("C.w.'s statements ...
that she was sexually abused by respondent were consistent as to both the act and the identity of
the [abuser] .... ).
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are true while inconsistent stories are not.244 Some experts opine that
a child who is abused is more likely to change his story out of confu-
sion or fear.2 4 5 Conversely, a child is certainly capable of repeating
the same false allegations. 2 4 6 Although inconsistencies do not invali-
date an accusation, they weigh on reliability. Finally, minor inconsis-
tencies do not prove that a child's statements are fabricated. 24 7 Courts
should overlook minor inconsistencies more for children than they do
for adults because a child's memory is not as focused as an adult's
memory. 248
Age is the fourth reliability factor under the proposed test. Gener-
ally, as a child's age increases, the reliability of his statements in-
creases; as a child's brain develops, that child gains a better grasp on
reality and is less susceptible to fantasy, prompting, or memory loss. 2 4 9
Some courts have suggested that young children cannot fabricate alle-
gations of sexual abuse because they have no knowledge of sexual
matters.2 5 0 This view is oversimplified, however, because studies show
that children can pick up on sexual matters easily. 251 Illinois courts
generally put too much stock in the belief that a young child is unable
to lie or is unfamiliar with sexual matters.252 For instance, in In re
K.L.M., the court stated, "[The victim] would have been most unlikely
to describe semen unless she had seen it, and it would have been un-
likely she had seen it unless the events she related had actually taken
place." 2 5 3 Finally, when a court considers the age factor, it should as-
sign more weight to statements by older children because suggestibil-
ity is a bigger problem for younger children. 254
Accuracy of the child's description is the next factor under the pro-
posed test; increased accuracy means increased reliability. When a
child accurately describes semen or an adult's anatomy, this knowl-
edge is significant and should speak strongly in favor of reliability.255
244. See Reilly, supra note 14, at 442.
245. See id. at 427.
246. See Yun, supra note 41, at 1751.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id.; see also Jason Fuller, Corporal Punishment and Child Development, 44 AKRON L.
REV. 5, 22-24 (2011); Walker, supra note 91, at 156-57 ("[M]emory improves rapidly as children
mature . . . .").
250. See, e.g., In re K.O., 782 N.E.2d 835, 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
251. See Reilly, supra note 14, at 442 ("[S]ome experts testify that sexually abused children
have a preoccupation with sex . . . .").
252. See In re K.L.M., 496 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
253. Id.
254. See Walker, supra note 91, at 159 (indicating that older children have a better grasp on
reality and the meanings of words).
255. See In re C.C., 586 N.E.2d 498, 503 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
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However, this evidence is not conclusive. Children are unlikely to
learn about sexual matters without inappropriate exposure, but they
might gain such knowledge from the media or from an adult question-
ing them about abuse. 256
The number of hearsay witnesses is the sixth factor indicating relia-
bility under the proposed test. When more than one witness testifies
that a child made a statement out of court, that statement is more
reliable. If a parent is the hearsay witness, others testifying to the
same statement can combat the possibility that the parent fabricated
the allegations or coached the child. Multiple witnesses can increase
the weight of the out-of-court statements. Of course, both witnesses
could be lying, could have coached the child, or could have heard the
same fantasized accusation.257 Therefore, courts should give state-
ments more weight when multiple witnesses hear them, but this factor
is not determinative.
Coaching is the final reliability factor. Courts should always con-
sider the possibility that a child has been coached by a parent. This is
an extremely important consideration because the potential for coach-
ing is high in sexual abuse cases.258 Courts should particularly con-
sider this factor in sexual abuse cases that arise in conjunction with a
divorce or custody action because false allegations are much more
common in that context.259 Courts should always consider coaching,
but it is less likely to have occurred in cases that do not involve a
custody battle.260
The above factors comprise the reliability prong of the proposed
test. Courts evaluating statements admitted under the hearsay excep-
tion statutes should consider the reliability of the statements before
considering whether they are sufficiently corroborated. After the
court determines how much weight to give the statements standing
alone, the analysis of those statements in conjunction with the other
evidence will be more effective. After considering reliability, the
court moves on to the corroboration prong of the test.
256. See Reilly, supra note 14, at 427.
257. See Yun, supra note 41, at 1751-52 (noting that some experts believe there is a "well-
established tendency of children to fantasize and tell stories").
258. See Marks, supra note 13, at 221-24.
259. See Rugani, supra note 26, at 871-72.
260. Id.
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2. Prong Two: Corroboration and the Value of Different Forms of
Independent Evidence
The second prong of the test formalizes the corroboration analysis.
At this point in the analysis, the court examines all evidence outside
the out-of-court statements. The second prong incorporates several
factors, which represent the typical forms of corroborative evidence
offered in sexual abuse cases. Corroborating evidence can be physical
or circumstantial. 261 Some types of corroborating evidence are more
probative than others. A discussion of the corroboration factors and
their value for supporting a finding of abuse follows.
The first factor is medical and forensic test results. Medical and
forensic tests revealing physical evidence are one of the best types of
corroborating evidence. 262 These tests constitute direct evidence, are
not subject to interpretation, and are not based on a subjective opin-
ion.2 6 3 If a child's medical exam reveals injuries consistent with sexual
abuse, it is highly probative. This evidence can also take the form of a
DNA match or a positive result of a sexually transmitted disease test
on the child.2 6 4 Out-of-court accusations by a child plus medical evi-
dence should usually be sufficient to support a finding of abuse be-
cause medical evidence is compelling. DNA evidence found on the
child that matches the accused is the most telling and is strong evi-
dence that abuse occurred.
The second corroboration factor concerns behavioral abnormalities
in the child. Case law shows that courts often rely on evidence of a
child's behavior to corroborate allegations of abuse.265 Courts should
certainly consider this evidence when determining whether corrobora-
tion exists but should not assign it as much weight as they assign physi-
cal evidence. Behavioral reactions to abuse can vary widely from
child to child,266 and psychology is not an exact science;267 therefore,
behavioral evidence is helpful but rarely definitive. 268 Additionally,
other factors besides abuse might be influencing the child's behavior.
A child may be experiencing emotional trauma because his parents
are divorcing or because he is involved in court proceedings. 269 Not-
261. In re A.P., 688 N.E.2d 642, 650 (Ill. 1997).
262. See id.
263. See Myers, supra note 14, at 9-11.
264. See Reilly, supra note 14, at 432-34.
265. Id. at 436.
266. See Mason, supra note 18, at 402.
267. Reilly, supra note 14, at 442.
268. See id.
269. Id. at 444 ("[T]he same attributes observed in known victims of child sexual abuse may
also be characteristic of a child who has suffered through a different trauma.").
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withstanding these problems, courts must often consider evidence of
behavior. It can be probative provided that the court takes its short-
comings into account and avoids giving it too much weight. Behavior
is probably most helpful when considered in the context of a timeline;
for instance, dramatic behavioral changes or regression in develop-
ment can be probative evidence of abuse.270 Specific examples of be-
havioral changes include sexualized behavior, withdrawal, depression,
hypervigilance, and anxiety.271
The third form of evidence courts should consider is the behavior of
the accused. Evidence that the accused has a prior conviction for a
sexual crime is significant. Courts should also consider whether the
accused has violated a previously imposed court order. Such a viola-
tion shows that the accused has broken judicially set boundaries. In-
appropriate actions by an accused not subject to a court order are also
probative, although they are less helpful. Without a clearly drawn line
to show what is and is not appropriate, a court is left to determine for
itself whether an accused acted improperly. This is a discretionary
and less certain method. Some jurisdictions examine the mental or
emotional state of the accused. 272 This factor encompasses that type
of evidence. Courts should not allow evidence of improper behavior
by the accused to determine the outcome of a case completely because
it is extremely circumstantial in nature. However, this evidence can
tend to show that the occurrence of abuse or identity of the abuser is
more or less likely.
The final form of corroborating evidence a court examines under
the proposed test is expert testimony. Experts often play an impor-
tant role in child sexual abuse cases. 273 However, courts have histori-
cally relied too heavily on the opinion of an expert in determining that
a child has been abused.274 Out-of-court statements plus an expert's
opinion should rarely be enough to support a finding of abuse. Expert
opinions are not reliable because child psychology is extremely com-
plicated and a perfect answer is impossible to reach.275 Experts often
disagree as to the meaning of the same behavior in a child.2 7 6 For
270. Myers, supra note 14, at 25-26.
271. Reilly, supra note 14, at 436; see also Mason, supra note 18, at 402 (noting the typical
characteristics of sexually abused children).
272. Reilly, supra note 14, at 433.
273. See id. at 420.
274. See, e.g., In re Alba, 540 N.E.2d 1116, 1118 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (overturning a trial court's
ruling that a father abused his child when the only evidence presented at trial was out-of-court
statements and expert testimony).
275. Reilly, supra note 14, at 442.
276. Further, one commentator indicates that experts might tailor their explanation of child
abuse syndrome to suit the child at issue. Mason, supra note 18, at 402.
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example, some experts opine that retraction, delayed reporting, and
inconsistencies are typical in abused children, while others assert the
opposite.277 Courts should not rest the outcome of the case on the
opinion of a psychology expert because too many variables affect a
child's psychology.278 Additionally, expert witnesses often use criteria
designed for treatment of children known to have suffered abuse-
rather than criteria designed to diagnose abuse-to corroborate a
child's allegations.279
The above discussion summarizes the essential aspects of each
prong of the proposed test. Neither list of factors is exhaustive. Each
case will have different facts and will include different forms of evi-
dence. 280 The proposed test merely reflects the types of evidence and
indicators of reliability seen most commonly in sexual abuse cases. 281
Of course, the trial court retains its capacity to weigh the credibility of
witnesses and evidence.282 The proposed test incorporates the relia-
bility factors and corroborative evidence that courts must consider,
while ensuring a structured analysis that prevents confusion. The test
relies on a bifurcated analysis that provides guidance without stripping
the judge of her discretion. The remainder of this Comment shows
why the proposed test is a necessary solution to a serious problem.
IV. IMPAcT
Without a standardized analysis, courts will continue to make judg-
ments without engaging in an in-depth analysis of the facts. The risk
that courts will find that abuse occurred "just in case" the allegations
are true will go unchecked. The proposed test will create consistency
among Illinois courts and lead to more uniform verdicts. It will pro-
tect children above any other party involved in a sexual abuse case.
A. Preponderance, Not Presumption: Weighing the Evidence Fairly
and Thoroughly Under the Proposed Test
The proposed test will combat any inclination of the courts to deter-
mine that a defendant is guilty of sexual abuse when a case presents a
277. Id.
278. Id. at 442-45.
279. Id. at 441; see also Mason, supra note 18, at 402.
280. See In re Brunken, 487 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) ("What facts or evidence will
serve as confirming or corroborative facts will necessarily vary depending on the facts to be
corroborated.").
281. See, e.g., In re Alba, 540 N.E.2d 1116 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); In re K.L.M., 496 N.E.2d 1262
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
282. In re A.P., 688 N.E.2d 642, 652 (Ill. 1997) ("The circuit court [is] in the best position to
determine the credibility and weight of the witnesses' testimony.").
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close question. Cases of sexual abuse in which a minor victim's state-
ments constitute evidence can be far more complex than they initially
seem. An assumption that most allegations of sexual abuse are
founded is far from accurate. 283 Some experts estimate that, in cases
coinciding with a divorce or custody dispute, allegations of child sex-
ual abuse are unfounded in 20% of cases.284 Weighing evidence in
favor of an accuser does nothing to acknowledge that fact and does
nothing to reduce the risk that this statistic illustrates. The current
approach requires trial judges to determine final verdicts without gui-
dance and based solely on discretion; the incentive to incline verdicts
toward finding that abuse occurred is real because it might seem like
the safer approach.
The proposed test, by setting up an established standard, both pro-
vides comfort for a judge and ensures a full and fair legal analysis of
the evidence. In Alba, the reversed trial court ruled that the defen-
dant committed the alleged abuse based solely on the child's out-of-
court statements and a vague expert opinion.285 Under the proposed
test, the risk of this situation recurring is far less likely. Firstly, the
judge will know not to reach a finding merely because out-of-court
statements are reliable and will recognize the importance of the cor-
roboration requirement because the test requires him to consider both
separately.28 6 Secondly, under the proposed test, the judge will recog-
nize that expert testimony is merely one small piece of the list of fac-
tors to consider and should not be conclusive.
B. Structure Meets Discretion: Consistency of Verdicts
Under the Proposed Test
It is essential that verdicts are determined properly at the trial level
because the standard of review on appeal is deferential. An appellate
court will not overturn a verdict unless it is "contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence," a highly deferential standard of review.287
Wrongfully convicted defendants face an uphill battle, assuming they
can afford to go through the appeals process. The amount of power
283. Marks, supra note 13, at 224; see also Jee, supra note 49, at 566 (reporting that as many as
65% of "reported sexual abuse cases are estimated to be unfounded" (footnote omitted)).
284. Marks, supra note 13, at 224.
285. Alba, 540 N.E.2d at 1118.
286. See In re Gilbert, 822 N.E.2d 116, 130 (IlL. App. Ct. 2004) (Reid, J., dissenting) ("I believe
the trial court improperly determined that the hearsay statements in question had been corrobo-
rated. The trial court made this erroneous determination because it only relied on further hear-
say to corroborate the original hearsay statements.").
287. A.P., 688 N.E.2d at 652.
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vested in the trial court is necessary, 288 but it increases the need to
ensure verdicts are accurate the first time. The proposed test accounts
for the need to reach a correct ruling at trial and makes doing so pos-
sible. The proposed test will have two important benefits at the trial
level: it will increase the number of correct rulings and ensure consis-
tency of verdicts from case to case and from court to court.
The proposed test will increase correct rulings because the rulings
will be based on a fair and thorough analysis. Under the current law,
judges rely on their own judgment and their own standards because
there is no uniform formula for deciding sexual abuse cases. Provid-
ing a uniform formula will help judges understand the value of differ-
ent types of evidence more thoroughly. It is unrealistic to expect
every judge to do independent research to discover the value of each
form of evidence. A codified test, however, provides that information
for them because it lays out and explains the different forms of evi-
dence. The uniform test will also ensure that the analysis is exhaustive
in every case. The danger that judges will ignore, or consider only
briefly, relevant evidence 289 is greatly reduced if they follow the step-
by-step procedure under the proposed test. The proposed test guar-
antees that the court will consider all evidence and will be empowered
to make an informed decision as to how much weight each piece of
evidence deserves.
The proposed test will ensure consistency because all courts will
conduct the same analysis. The facts of each case will necessarily dif-
fer; however, the proposed test is flexible enough to apply in varying
fact patterns. The uniform analysis will provide a guide to the courts
that is relevant for any situation presented. It will also lead to una-
nimity among courts about how to determine whether out-of-court
statements are reliable and how much weight to give the statements
themselves. Most importantly, the proposed test will prevent courts
from conflating reliability and corroboration. Because the system of
analysis is bifurcated, completely separating the reliability analysis
from the corroboration analysis, courts must consider the two prongs
individually and will avoid the error of basing their verdicts on relia-
bility alone.
288. The rule that the trial court is "in the best position to determine the credibility and
weight of the witnesses' testimony and to resolve conflicts in their testimony because" it has "the
opportunity to observe their demeanor and conduct" is well established. Id.
289. See, e.g., Gilbert, 822 N.E.2d at 131 (Reid, J., dissenting) ("[T]he trial court failed to
adequately consider Bradley's allegations that before their divorce, Lynette had threatened to
use his family history of sexual abuse . . . against him with regards to the custody of their
children.").
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V. CONCLUSION
The results of sexual abuse cases involving children are too impor-
tant to leave to chance. The legislature enacted the hearsay exception
statutes to provide heightened protection to child victims of sexual
abuse. Failing to provide an adequate way to utilize those protections
in practice does a disservice to child victims and accused parties. Al-
though stricter application of evidentiary standards in sexual abuse
cases might appear, at first blush, to benefit only defendants, the op-
posite is true. The function of the courts must be to seek out truth in
potentially abusive situations, particularly those involving families.
The discrepancies among cases reveal that courts are applying eviden-
tiary standards differently and that they often conflate a reliability
analysis with the corroboration requirement. The proposed test will
provide more protection for children because it empowers courts to
truly find their best interests. Certainly, when a child suffers abuse,
removal from the abusive situation is in his best interest. However,
automatic removal from any suspicious situation is not in his best in-
terest. The proposed test provides children the lengthy and thorough
investigations that their cases deserve.
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